CO129-591-10 Military Administration 16-1-1945 - 28-3-1946 — Page 136

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by every test of which I can think this principle seems unsound (and assuring as it does that the Planning Unit will be bundled into uniform at the very last moment untrained, militarily at sea,and exceedingly unhappy) I do not suppose we

usefully dispute it. But should not even the Civil Affairs Directorate take some account of the possibility that the Japanese will suddenly cave in? It would seem from their point of view ordinary prudence to militarize the Unit now, and from the Imperial point of view it seems

a very cheap form of re-insurance. If the Japane se do in fact open negotiations say two months from now the Borneo scramble would be an orderly procession in comparison with what we should have to go through.

10. I do not wish to prolong this note (and I am very conscious that it adds little or nothing to what is already known) but there is one final point in favour of early militarization which from my point of view is among the most important. It concerns the personal position of the individual members of this Unit. However good the will, there is a limit to the power of working in a vacuum; and I am afraid that there is a growing mood of disenchantment among the officers engaged in planning for Hong Kong. Not a few have lost all they possessed in the Colony; others have inescapable commitments based on Hong Kong allowances and income tax; the majority have to maintain two establishments and in London to pay rents at short term rates taken at the very top of the war- time market; all are liable to United Kingdom income tax. The general expectation was that militarization would take place early this year, the reby putting a limit to the financial strain which cannot be borne indefinitely. Militarization seems no nearer, and several officers have had to reconsider their position; four key men are at or near the end of their financial tether and have informed me privately that they must shortly resign. I know that others are approaching the same point. Eventually we shall all reach it. I know that this argument will melt no hearts outside the Colonial Office, and that it cannot be used in dealing with other Departments. It is nevertheless true that militarization would in some measure relieve the personal problem which I have indicated above.

Om meet M.

7.5.45.